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Imported Inputs and Productivity
By La´szlo´ Halpern, Miklo´s Koren and Adam Szeidl∗
We estimate a model of importers in Hungarian micro data and
conduct counterfactual analysis to investigate the effect of imported
inputs on productivity. We find that importing all input varieties
would increase a firm’s revenue productivity by 22 percent, about
half of which is due to imperfect substitution between foreign and
domestic inputs. Foreign firms use imports more effectively and
pay lower fixed import costs. We attribute a quarter of Hungarian
productivity growth during 1993-2002 to imported inputs. Simu-
lations show that the productivity gain from a tariff cut is larger
when the economy has many importers and many foreign firms.
JEL: F12,F14
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Understanding the link between international trade and aggregate productiv-
ity is one of the major challenges in international economics. To learn more
about this link at the microeconomic level, a recent literature explores the ef-
fect of imported inputs—which constitute the majority of world trade—on firm
productivity. Studies show that improved access to foreign inputs has increased
firm productivity in several countries, including Indonesia (Mary Amiti Jozef
Konings 2007), Chile (Hiroyuki Kasahara Joel Rodrigue 2008) and India (Petia
Topalova Amit Khandelwal 2011).1 A next step in this research agenda is to in-
vestigate the underlying mechanism through which imports increase productivity.
As Juan Carlos Hallak James A Levinsohn (2008) emphasize, understanding
which firms gain most, through what channel, and how the effect depends on the
economic environment, are important for evaluating the welfare and redistributive
implications of trade policies.
To explore these questions, we estimate a structural model of importer firms
∗ Halpern: Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and CEPR, Budao¨rsi u´t 45.,
Budapest 1112, Hungary, halpern@econ.core.hu. Koren: Central European University, IEHAS and
CEPR, Na´dor utca 9., Budapest 1051, Hungary, korenm@ceu.edu. Szeidl: Central European University
and CEPR, Na´dor utca 9., Budapest 1051, Hungary, szeidla@ceu.edu. We thank Ma´rta Bisztray, Istva´n
Ilye´s, Pe´ter To´th and Pe´ter Zsoha´r for excellent research assistance, Pol Antra`s, Pe´ter Benczu´r, Christian
Broda, Jan De Loecker, Penny Goldberg, Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz, Ariel Pakes,
Roberto Rigobon, John Romalis, David Weinstein, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants
for helpful comments. For financial support, we thank the Global Development Network (Award RRC
IV-061 to Halpern and Koren) the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (Award T048444 to Halpern and
Koren) the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Szeidl) and the European Research Council under the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013) ERC grant agreements number 313164 (Koren)
and 283484 (Szeidl). The authors declare that they have no relevant or material financial interests that
relate to the research described in this paper.
1Results are conflicting for Brazil: Adriana Schor (2004) estimates a positive effect while Marc An-
dreas Muendler (2004) finds no effect of imported inputs on productivity. And for Argentina Gita
Gopinath Brent Neiman (2013) show that variation in imported inputs may have contributed to fluctu-
ations in aggregate productivity.
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in Hungarian firm-level data, and conduct counterfactual policy analysis in our
estimated economy. Our starting point is a dataset that contains detailed in-
formation on imported goods for essentially all Hungarian manufacturing firms
during 1992-2003. Motivated by stylized facts in these data, we formulate a model
of firms who use differentiated inputs to produce a final good. Firms must pay a
fixed cost each period for each variety they choose to import. Imported inputs af-
fect firm productivity through two distinct channels: as in quality-ladder models
they may have a higher price-adjusted quality, and as in product-variety models
they imperfectly substitute domestic inputs.2 Because of these forces, firm pro-
ductivity increases in the number of varieties imported. Our model also permits
rich heterogeneity across products and firms.
In the first half of the paper we estimate this model in micro data. In doing so,
we face the key empirical challenge that imports are chosen endogenously by the
firm. We deal with this identification problem using a structural approach which
exploits the product-level nature of the data. Our model implies a firm-level pro-
duction function in which output depends on capital, labor, materials, and a term
related to the number of imported varieties. To estimate this production function,
we follow G. Steven Olley Ariel Pakes (1996) in nonparametrically controlling
for firm investment and other state variables, which pick up the unobserved com-
ponent of productivity. We also build on the approach of Jan De Loecker (2011)
to control for demand effects, and follow Amit Gandhi, Salvador Navarro David
Rivers (2013) in estimating the materials coefficient from input demand. Given
these controls, the import effect is identified from residual variation in the number
of imported varieties. Intuitively, we estimate the difference in output between
two firms that have the same productivity and face the same level of demand,
but differ in the number of varieties they choose to import, which, according to
our model, happens because they face a different fixed cost of importing.
Our results show that the productivity gains from imported inputs are sub-
stantial. In the baseline specification, increasing the fraction of tradeable goods
imported by a firm from zero to 100 percent would increase revenue productivity
by 22 percent and quantity productivity by 24 percent. We continue to estimate
large productivity gains from importing when—as in models in which the cost of
importing is sunk, rather than fixed—measures of the firm’s past importing be-
havior are included as state variables. These results suggest that imported inputs
play a significant role in shaping firm performance in the Hungarian economy.
We then turn to decompose the import effect into the quality and imperfect
substitution channels. We first note that for a given productivity gain from
importing a good, the degree of substitution governs a firm’s expenditure share
of foreign versus domestic purchases. For example, when foreign and domestic
inputs are close to perfect substitutes, even if the productivity gain from imports
2For quality-ladder models see Philippe Aghion Peter Howitt (1992) or Gene M. Grossman Elhanan
Helpman (1991). Variety effects are introduced in Wilfred J. Ethier (1982).
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is small the import share should be high.3 Based on this idea, we then infer the
relative magnitude of the two channels by comparing the expenditure share of
imports for firms which differ in the number of imported varieties. We find that
combining imperfectly substitutable foreign and domestic varieties is responsible
for about half of the productivity gain from imports. This finding parallels the
evidence in Penny Goldberg, Amit Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik Petia Topalova
(2009) that combining foreign and domestic varieties increased firms’ product
scope in India; and also the theoretical arguments of Albert O. Hirschman (1958),
Michael Kremer (1993) and Charles I. Jones (2011) that complementarities, which
amplify differences in input quality, may help explain large cross-country income
differences.
We next explore whether the benefits from importing differ between foreign
and domestic firms. We say that a firm “has been foreign owned” if either on the
current date or on some past date its majority owners were foreigners.4 Because
they have know-how about foreign markets and can access cheap suppliers abroad,
these firms may gain more from spending on imports. This is an important
possibility because firms that had been foreign owned played a central role in
Hungary: during 1992-2003, their sales share in manufacturing increased from 21
percent to 80 percent. When we re-estimate our model allowing for differences
in the efficiency of import use by ownership status, we find that firms that have
been foreign owned benefit about 24 percent more than purely domestic firms
from each dollar they spend on imports. We also conduct an event study of
ownership changes which yields suggestive evidence that part of the premium in
the efficiency of import use is caused by foreign ownership. This result implies a
potential complementarity between foreign presence and importing.
Our analysis also yields estimates of the product-level fixed costs of importing.
We find that—as in the model of Gopinath Neiman (2013)—these costs increase
in the number of imported products, and also that the fixed cost schedule of
firms that have been foreign owned is below that of domestic firms. Lower import
costs are thus a second factor generating higher benefits from importing to foreign
firms.
In the second half of the paper, we develop two applications to study the eco-
nomic and policy implications of our estimates. We first quantify the contribution
of imports to productivity growth in Hungary during 1993-2002. Our estimates
imply a productivity gain of 21.1 percent in the Hungarian manufacturing sec-
tor, of which 5.9 percentage points, more than one quarter, can be attributed to
import-related mechanisms. Approximately 80 percent of these import-related
gains are due to the increased volume and number of imported inputs, while the
3This link between import demand and the role of complementarities is also exploited by Robert C
Feenstra (1994), Christian Broda David E. Weinstein (2006) and Christian Broda, Joshua Greenfield
David Weinstein (2006) in country level data.
4The vast majority of firms that had been foreign owned at some past date remained foreign owned
for the duration of their life in our sample. Our definition reflects our view that foreign ownership has
lasting effects on firm operations.
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other 20 percent is the result of increased foreign ownership in combination with
foreign firms being better at using imports. Thus imports contributed substan-
tially to economic growth in Hungary, and the complementarity between foreign
presence and importing had a sizeable aggregate effect. These results complement
the findings of Gopinath Neiman (2013) who emphasize the role of imported in-
puts in driving fluctuations in aggregate productivity.
In our second application we use simulations in the estimated economy to ex-
plore the productivity implications of tariff policies. Intuitively, a tariff cut, by
reducing the cost of foreign inputs, should raise both firm-level and aggregate
productivity. Our main result is that the size of the aggregate productivity gain
depends positively on two broad features of the environment: (1) the initial import
participation of producers; (2) the degree of foreign presence. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, higher initial import participation—either due to low tariffs or to low fixed
costs—implies larger gains from a tariff cut. This is because the set of inputs
whose prices are affected is larger, and hence firms save more with the tariff cut.
In turn, foreign presence matters because, as we have shown, foreign-owned firms
are better in using imports.
These patterns lead to complementarities between different liberalization poli-
cies. For example, our simulations show that tariff cuts increase productivity
more when the fixed costs of importing—such as licensing or other non-tariff-
barriers—are also reduced. Because foreign firms are more effective in using im-
ports, a similar complementarity exists between tariff cuts and FDI liberalization.
These complementarities seem broadly consistent with the liberalization experi-
ence in the early 1990s in India. Consistent with the fixed cost complementarity,
tariff cuts in India, which were accompanied by dismantling substantial non-tariff
barriers, lead to rapid growth in new imported varieties Goldberg et al. (2009)
and a large increase in firm productivity Topalova Khandelwal (2011). And con-
sistent with the foreign ownership complementarity, these effects were stronger in
industries with higher FDI liberalization Topalova Khandelwal (2011).
Our tariff experiment also highlights the differential implications for domestic
input demand of the quality and imperfect substitution mechanisms. When the
benefit of imports comes from quality differences, domestic import use—in an
intermediate range—is quite sensitive to tariffs. In contrast, when the benefit
from imports comes from imperfect substitution, domestic input use is a relatively
flat function of tariffs. This difference is intuitive: when foreign goods are close
to perfect substitutes, even a small price change can bring about large import
substitution. Another force is that losses to domestic input suppliers caused
by a tariff cut are partially offset by increased demand for their products due
to increased productivity.5 Because our estimates assign a significant role to
imperfect substitution, and because of the second force, we obtain a relatively
inelastic demand curve for domestic inputs. One lesson from this analysis is that
5This logic is similar to that in Gene M. Grossman Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2008) who argue that
offshoring can sometimes—surprisingly—increase domestic labor demand due to the increase in output.
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the magnitude of redistributive losses due to import substitution depend strongly
on the extent of substitution and on the initial level of tariffs. More broadly,
identifying the specific mechanism driving the effect of trade policies can help
evaluate the impact of these policies in other dimensions.
Besides the papers cited above, we build on a growing empirical literature ex-
ploring firm behavior in international markets, reviewed in Andrew B. Bernard,
J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding Peter K. Schott (2007) and An-
drew B Bernard, J Bradford Jensen, Stephen J Redding Peter K Schott
(2012). James R. Tybout (2003) summarizes earlier plant- and firm-level empiri-
cal work testing theories of international trade. Our structural approach parallels
Sanghamitra Das, Mark J. Roberts James R. Tybout (2007) who study ex-
port subsidies, Hiroyuki Kasahara Beverly Lapham (2008) who investigate the
link between exports and imports, and Jan De Loecker, Pinelopi K. Goldberg,
Amit K. Khandelwal Nina Pavcnik (2014) who study the effect of trade liber-
alization on markups. Our basic theoretical framework also builds on work by
Wilfred J. Ethier (1979) and James R. Markusen (1989) who develop models
connecting imported inputs and productivity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and
documents stylized facts about importers in Hungary. Building on these facts, in
Section 3 we develop a simple model of importer-producers. Section 4 describes
the estimation procedure and Section 5 describes the results. In Section 6 we use
the estimates to conduct counterfactual analysis. We discuss some caveats with
our approach in the concluding Section 7.
I. Data
A. Data and sample definition
Main data sources. Our panel of essentially all Hungarian manufacturing firms
during 1992-2003 is created by merging balance sheet data and trade data for
these firms. Firms’ balance sheets and profit and loss statements come from the
Hungarian Tax Authority for 1992-1999, and from the Hungarian Statistical Office
for 2000-2003. The data for 1992-1999 contain all firms which are required to file a
balance sheet with the tax authority, i.e., all but the smallest companies, with the
main omitted category firms being individual entrepreneurs without employees.
The data for 2000-2003 include all firms with at least 20 employees and a random
sample of firms with 5-20 employees. We thus lose some firms in 2000. These
firms, however, constitute a relatively small share of output: during 1992-1999,
firms with no more than 20 workers were responsible for less than 7.5 percent
of total sales. We classify a firm to be in the manufacturing sector if it reports
manufacturing as a primary activity for at least half of its lifetime in the data,
and exclude all other firms.
Data on firms’ annual export and import value, disaggregated by products at
the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) level, come from the Hungarian Customs
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Statistics. Because the 6-digit classification is noisy, we aggregate the data to the
4-digit level. In the rest of the paper we use the terms “product” and “good” to
refer to a HS4 category.6 Because we are interested in the effect of imported in-
puts, we use data on those imported products which are classified as intermediate
goods, industrial supplies or capital good parts in the Broad Economic Categories
classification. We merge the balance sheet and trade data using unique numerical
firm identifiers.
While we have product level data on imported input purchases, a limitation
is that—because balance sheets only measure total spending on intermediate
goods—we do not have corresponding product-level data for domestic input pur-
chases. We will rely on our structural model and on input-output tables to work
around this data issue. A second limitation is that we do not observe firms’ import
purchases from domestic wholesalers such as export-import companies. We can,
however, measure the role of such indirect imports for the economy as a whole.
In our data the total value of intermediate imports by wholesalers and retailers
is about 2 percent of total intermediate input use by all firms in all sectors. This
fact suggests that in our data the role of intermediation for inputs is relatively
small, and due to lack of additional data we ignore it below.
Processing trade. An important source of measurement error in our data is that
some firms engage in processing trade. In exchange for a fee, these firms import,
process and re-export intermediate goods which remain the property of a foreign
party throughout. Because the processing firm does not own, purchase or sell the
underlying goods, processing trade is not recorded on the firm’s balance sheet.
However, because these goods cross the border, processing trade is recorded in our
trade data. This inconsistency creates problems: in several observations, the value
of imported intermediate inputs, as measured by customs, exceeds the value of
all intermediate inputs, as measured by the balance sheet. Similarly, some firms’
exports in the customs data are substantially higher than their exports in the
balance sheet data.
To deal with this reporting problem, we construct a measure of each firm’s
processing trade. This measure is defined as the difference, when it is positive,
between customs exports and balance sheet exports. We classify a firm as a
“processer” in a given year if the ratio of processing trade to balance sheet sales
exceeds 2.5 percent. This cutoff is approximately the median across observations
in which the ratio is positive. With this definition, about 9 percent of our observa-
tions are classified as processers. To obtain measures which reflect the underlying
economic activity rather than accounting rules, we then adjust, for all firms, sales
and total intermediate spending from the balance sheet by adding our measure
of processing trade.
Sample definitions. We create two data samples for our analysis. Our main
sample is defined by excluding all firm-year observations in which the firm is
6Firms often switch their main export product at the 6-digit level; this happens infrequently at 4
digits.
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classified as a processer. We also define a firm-level sample which is obtained by
fully excluding firms which are processers for more than half of the years they are
in our sample. The reason for the exclusions is that our adjustment for processing
likely introduces considerable noise.7 The benefit of the firm-level sample is that,
because it does not permit changes in the set of firms over time due to changes
in processing activity, it better reflects aggregate trends in the data. Because it
has more observations, unless otherwise noted we will use the main sample in
our analysis. After all exclusions, 127,472 firm-year observations remain in this
sample.
Variable definitions. For each firm in each year, the balance sheet data contain
information on the ownership shares of domestic and foreign owners. We say that
firm j in year t “has been foreign owned” if either in that year or in some prior
year foreigners had majority ownership. This definition is motivated by the view
that foreign ownership has lasting effects on a firm’s operations. It also solves the
problem that for some firms ownership data is missing in some years. Reflecting
the fact that only a quarter of the 5,009 firms that have been foreign owned ever
switch back to majority domestic ownership, we sometimes simply refer to a firm
which has been foreign owned as “foreign.”
Because firms must file balance sheets in the county in which they are head-
quartered, we can classify each firm in each year as being located in one of the 20
counties in Hungary (19 actual counties and the city of Budapest). The firm-level
data also contain information on the firm’s industry. We work with the 2-digit
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, revision 3) industry defi-
nitions, and for firms that report different industries in different years, we assign
the most common industry reported.
Other data sources. We obtain 2-digit industry-level input and output price
indices for 1992-2003 from the Hungarian Statistical Office. We also exploit an
industry-level input-output table which was constructed for the year 2000 by the
Hungarian Statistical Office.
B. Summary statistics and stylized facts
We document three basic facts about firms’ import behavior in the data, which
will guide the specification of our formal model in Section II.
FACT 1: There is substantial heterogeneity in the import patterns of firms. Half
of firms do not import at all; firms which are larger or have been foreign owned
are more likely to import.
This fact can be seen by comparing across columns in Table 1. This table
presents summary statistics for several key variables in our main sample separately
for importing and non-importing firms. Importers employ about 6 times as many
7While we believe the exclusions are justified on prior grounds, keeping these firms in the sample and
including an indicator for processers in all empirical specifications does not affect our qualitative results.
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Table 1—Descriptive statistics
Full sample Non-importers Importers
Employment 48.85 17.42 98.87
Sales (thousand USD) 2,870 420 6,770
Capital per worker (thousand USD) 13.75 11.22 17.76
Sales per worker (thousand USD) 51.32 36.99 74.11
Material share in output 0.82 0.79 0.87
Exporter indicator 0.35 0.15 0.68
Export share in output 0.10 0.04 0.20
Importer indicator 0.39 0.00 1.00
Import share in materials 0.10 0.00 0.27
Number of imported products (HS4) 4.71 0.00 12.22
Foreign owned 0.19 0.09 0.34
State owned 0.03 0.02 0.04
Number of observations 127,472 78,273 49,199
Number of firms 26,593 20,921 13,341
Notes: Table entries are means unless otherwise noted. Column 1 is based on the full sample
defined in Section 2.1. Column 2 is computed for firm-years in which the firm does not
import, and column 3 is computed for firm-years in which the firm does import. The number
of firms in columns 2 and 3 add up to more than the total number of firms because of firms
that switch importer status. USD values are in 1998 dollars.
workers and sell about 16 times as much as non-importers. Importers are also
more frequently foreign and more likely to export.8
There is also substantial heterogeneity within importers in the number of prod-
ucts they import. Regressing the log number of imported products on log em-
ployment and an indicator for whether the firm has been foreign owned shows
that doubling firm size is associated with a 25 percent increase in the number of
imported products, and, conditional on size, firms which have been foreign owned
import 187 percent more products than purely domestic firms.
The patterns shown here are consistent with a model in which entry in import
markets entails a fixed cost. Larger or more productive firms profit more from a
given product and hence find it easier to overcome the fixed cost. Similarly, foreign
firms may have lower fixed or variable costs of importing and hence purchase more
foreign varieties.
FACT 2: Import spending is concentrated on a few core products; firms spend
little on their remaining imports.
To document this fact, for each firm, we order imported products by their
share in the total import spending of the firm. Using this ranking, among firms
importing five or more products, the average spending share (out of total import
spending) of the highest-ranked product is 54 percent. Thus, on average, firms
8Firm-level evidence from other countries shows similar patterns: for example, Andrew B. Bernard,
J. Bradford Jensen Peter K. Schott (2009) document that “globally engaged firms” in the U.S. are
superior along a number of dimensions.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE IMPORTED INPUTS AND PRODUCTIVITY 9
spend more than half of their import budget on a single product. In contrast, the
average spending share of the fifth-highest ranked product is only 3.4 percent.
This substantial heterogeneity across goods may be important for evaluating the
productivity gain from importing new products.
FACT 3: The extensive margin plays a large role in explaining both the aggregate
trend and the firm-level fluctuations in import growth.
Table 2—Import dynamics
Import growth Contributions to import growth
Year
Total imports
(USD millions)
Import
growth
(percent)
Intensive
margin
(pp)
New firms
(pp)
New
importers
(pp)
New
products
(pp)
Stopping
firms
(pp)
Stopping
importers
(pp)
Dropped
products
(pp)
1992 1,968
1993 2,358 19.8 16.2 9.6 5.1 10.6 -12.5 -2.6 -6.5
1994 3,182 35.0 28.2 3.0 5.6 8.1 -3.2 -1.3 -5.5
1995 3,885 22.1 18.6 3.3 1.9 5.6 -1.3 -1.6 -4.3
1996 5,194 33.7 12.0 2.1 4.6 24.2 -3.2 -1.0 -4.9
1997 6,668 28.4 26.1 2.0 1.2 3.9 -1.8 -0.3 -2.8
1998 8,875 33.1 32.1 0.7 0.6 3.0 -0.5 -0.3 -2.4
1999 10,799 21.7 20.4 1.4 0.4 2.2 -0.8 -0.3 -1.7
2000 13,421 24.3 21.7 8.0 0.6 1.8 -6.5 -0.1 -1.3
2001 16,413 22.3 21.3 0.2 1.6 2.8 -2.0 -0.5 -0.9
2002 15,425 -6.0 -3.6 0.4 0.4 1.2 -3.1 -0.4 -0.9
2003 14,521 -5.9 -4.5 0.4 1.0 1.1 -1.3 -0.1 -2.5
Average 20.8 17.1 2.8 2.1 5.9 -3.3 -0.8 -3.1
1992 to 2003 637.8 111.4 513.4 11.5 53.1 -38.2 -0.8 -12.5
Notes: Total imports are in 1998 dollars. The contributions to import growth columns measure the percentage point increase in imports
attributable to different mechanisms and sum to the import growth column. The intensive margin measures (net) growth in imports of products
that the firm also imported the previous period (the previous year, and in the last row 1992). New firms are firms that did not exist in the
previous period, new importers are firms that existed but did not import in the previous period, new products are newly imported products of
existing importers. Stopping firms, stopping importers and dropped products are defined analogously.
Table 2, constructed from our firm-level sample, shows aggregate trends in firm
imports over time. The table decomposes the growth in imported intermediate
inputs in the manufacturing sector into a within-firm intensive margin and six
different extensive margins: new firms, new importers, new imported products;
and exiting firms, firms stopping to import, and within-firm shedding of imported
products. It is instructive to look at the average of these decompositions over all
years, reported in the second to last row. On average, imports of intermediate
inputs grew by 20.8 percent per year. This growth can be decomposed into a
within-firm intensive margin, which contributed 17.1 percentage points; growth
on the three extensive margins (firms, importers, products) which contributed
10.8 percentage points; and decline on the three extensive margins which con-
tributed −7.1 percentage points. Among the extensive margins, firms adding
new imported products was the biggest contributor (5.9 percentage points). The
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large magnitude of the extensive margin calls for an explicit model of the deci-
sion to enter additional import markets. And the comparable magnitudes of the
margins associated with adding and shedding imported inputs (5.9 and 3.1 per-
centage points) suggest that the decision to import likely entails some per-period
fixed costs.9
The last row in the table reports a similar decomposition for the entire 1992-
2003 period. During this time imports grew by about 693 percent. The main
component of this growth, explaining 571 percentage points, is the “new firms”
margin: imports by firms that did not exist in 1992. This fact suggests that
manufacturing in Hungary underwent substantial restructuring during our sample
period. One of our goals in this paper is to examine the productivity implications
of this restructuring and the associated increase in importing.
II. An Industry Equilibrium Model of Imported Inputs
Motivated by the above stylized facts, in this section we build a static model of
industry equilibrium in which firms use both domestic and imported intermediate
goods for production.
A. Setup
Production technology. Firms in industry s are indexed by j = 1, ..., Js. The
output of firm j is given by the production function
(1) Qj = ΩjK
α
j L
β
j
N∏
i=1
Xγiji ,
where Kj and Lj denote capital and labor used in production, Xji denotes the
quantity of intermediate composite good i used by firm j, and Ωj is Hicks neutral
total factor productivity (TFP). The Cobb-Douglas weight γi measures the im-
portance of intermediate input i for production. Motivated by Fact 2, we allow
γi to be different for different goods i. The total weight of all intermediate goods
is γ =
∑
i γi. We assume that the production structure—characterized by the
parameters α, β, γi, and the set of intermediate inputs—is the same for all firms
in industry s.
Each intermediate good Xji is assembled from a combination of a foreign and
a domestic variety:
(2) Xji =
[
(BjiXjiF )
θ−1
θ +X
θ−1
θ
jiH
] θ
θ−1
,
9Due to the change in sample definition, we lose some importing firms in 2000 (see Section I.A). These
observations are classified as exiting firms, but because we only lose firms with 20 or fewer employees,
the vast majority of which do not import, their effect on the volume-weighted numbers in the table is
likely to be small.
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where XjiF and XjiH are the quantity of foreign and domestic inputs, and θ is
the elasticity of substitution. The prices of the domestic and foreign varieties
are denoted PiH and PiF , and we assume that the firms are price takers in these
input markets. The price-adjusted quality advantage of the foreign input is Aji =
BjiPiH/PiF . Intuitively, Aji measures the advantage of a dollar spent on a foreign
relative to a domestic variety.
We make several simplifying assumptions about intermediate inputs. To allow
for non-tradeable inputs in a simple way, we assume that they coincide with the
set of services, and assign an infinitely high foreign price and hence Aji = 0 to
them. We can then estimate the input share of non-tradeables from an input-
output table. We also assume that the price-adjusted quality Aji of all tradeable
goods used by firm j is the same across inputs within a group of firms: Aji = A.
This assumption simplifies our analysis and still allows us to estimate the average
quality advantage of imports. Note, we do not restrict A > 1, because we also
want to allow foreign goods to have potentially lower quality than domestic goods.
When estimating the model, in some specifications we permit A to depend on
characteristics such as year or whether the firm has been foreign owned. We order
indices so that inputs 1, 2..., Ng represent tradeable goods, while the remaining
Ng + 1, ..., N inputs represent non-tradeable services. We also order tradeable
goods by their production weight, so that γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ ... ≥ γNg .
Motivated by stylized fact 3, we assume that the firm must pay fixed costs
to access foreign intermediate inputs. Similarly to Gopinath Neiman (2013)
we assume that firm j faces a fixed cost schedule: when it is already importing
i− 1 intermediate inputs, importing an additional input requires an incremental
fixed cost f ij ≥ 0. Thus if firm j imports i types goods, it pays a total cost of
f1j + f
2
j + ... + f
i
j . We denote f¯j = (f
1
j , ..., f
Ng
j ). To make the model consistent
with the high frequency of exit from import markets, when estimating the model
we assume that these costs are due every period.
Uncertainty. We assume that the log of Ωj can be written as ωj = ω
obs
j + εj
where the firm observes ωobsj before it makes import choices, but it observes εj
only after all choices have been made.
Demand. Demand for goods in industry s is determined by the preferences
(3) U({Qj}Jsj=1) =
 Js∑
j=1
V
1/η
j Q
(η−1)/η
j
η/(η−1)
where η is the elasticity of substitution between products and Vj is a demand
shifter associated with the product of firm j. We normalize
∑Js
j=1 Vj = 1. To
ensure that a solution to the firm’s profit-maximization problem exists, we also
assume α+ β + γ < η/(η − 1).
Timing. We assume that Kj and Lj are predetermined, and use the model to
understand how input purchases, output, revenue and price are determined in
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equilibrium.
Discussion. Our production specification incorporates both the quality and
variety gains from importing emphasized in the literature. Following Grossman
Helpman (1991), we interpret quality as the advantage in services provided by
a good relative to its cost. The natural measure of the quality gain is therefore
price-adjusted quality A, which can also be interpreted as the firm’s efficiency
advantage (per dollar of spending) when using a foreign, rather than a domestic,
input. Imperfect substitution, i.e., the idea that combining foreign and domestic
goods create gains that are greater than the sum of the parts, is measured by
the elasticity of substitution θ. Our setup thus allows for flexibility in the de-
gree of substitution as well as heterogeneity across inputs while maintaining the
tractability of the Cobb-Douglas model. As we show below, this framework also
gets around a data limitation by generating estimating equations that involve
product-level information only for imported, but not domestic input purchases.
B. Model solution
Input choices. We first consider the gain from importing a particular interme-
diate input i. The effective price of the composite good Xji if the firm chooses to
import variety i can be found by solving the cost-minimization problem associated
with (2):
(4) Pji =
[
P 1−θiH + (PiF /Bji)
1−θ
]1/(1−θ)
= PiH
[
1 +Aθ−1
]1/(1−θ)
using the notation that Aji = BjiPiH/PiF and our assumption that Aji = A.
Because the price of the composite good Xji is Pji = PiH if the firm only uses
the domestic input, the (log) percentage reduction in the cost of the tradeable
composite good i when imports are also used is
(5) a =
log
[
1 +Aθ−1
]
θ − 1 .
Parameter a measures the per-product import gain and hence is of central interest
to us. This parameter incorporates the cost-savings created by both the quality
and the imperfect-substitution channels, and hence it is higher when the price-
adjusted quality A is higher or when the degree of substitution θ is lower. Because
of imperfect substitution, for finite θ the firm uses both domestic and foreign
inputs, so that the optimal expenditure share of the foreign good in the total
spending for variety i,
(6) S = Aθ−1/(1 +Aθ−1)
satisfies 0 < S < 1.
Connecting nj to import demand and output. In choosing which varieties to
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import, the firm trades off the saving in marginal cost from using imports against
the fixed cost of importing. Since the fixed cost schedule only depends on the
number of imported products, and since the per-product gain a is the same for
all products, a firm which imports n products will choose to import those with
the highest γ weight, i.e., products i = 1, ..., n. We now use this observation to
characterize how nj affects import demand and output.
The following function measures the relative importance for production of the
inputs the firm chooses to import:
(7) G(nj) =
∑nj
i=1 γi∑N
i=1 γi
=
∑nj
i=1 γi
γ
.
Since γ1 ≥ γ2, ... ≥ γNg ≥ 0, the G(·) function is increasing and concave. Because
the denominator includes the weights of both goods and non-traded services, the
maximum of G(·), denoted G¯ = G(Ng), equals the share of tradable inputs in all
intermediate inputs.
Now consider import demand conditional on nj . Denoting expenditure on all
intermediate inputs by Mj =
∑N
i=1 PjiXji and expenditure on foreign intermedi-
ate inputs by MFj =
∑N
i=1 PiFXjiF , the spending share on imports—a measure
of import demand—equals
(8)
MFj
Mj
= S
∑nj
i=1 γi
γ
= SG(nj)
where S, defined in (6), is the optimal expenditure share of imports within a
composite good. Intuitively, firms that import a greater number of products nj
have a larger share of foreign goods in total intermediate spending.
Next consider output conditional on nj . Let % = Γ
∏N
i=1 P
γi/γ
iH denote the
price of the composite of domestic intermediate inputs in industry s, where
Γ =
∏N
i=1(γi/γ)
−γi/γ is a constant. We assume that this is the price index the
statistical office computes for industry inputs. For a firm which chooses to import
nj varieties and optimally chooses the composition of domestic and foreign inputs
within each such variety, we show in Appendix A that the production function
(1) implies
(9) qj = αkj + βlj + γ(mj − ρ) + aγG(nj) + ωj
where the lowercase variables qj , kj , lj , mj , ωj denote logs and ρ = log(%).
The first three terms on the right-hand side measure the contribution to output
of capital, labor, and intermediate inputs; the final term is the Hicks-neutral
productivity shifter ω. The novelty in the equation is the fourth term, which
represents the contribution of imports. Intuitively, a firm which chooses to import
nj varieties will have a percentage cost reduction of a on the associated composite
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inputs, the total weight of which is
∑nj
i=1 γi. This cost reduction maps into a
corresponding increase in output for a given total spending on intermediate inputs.
Industry equilibrium. To determine revenue and profits, we need to combine
equation (9) with the demand for the firm’s product. Let the industry output
price index P be defined by P 1−η =
∑
j∈s VjP
1−η
j , and let industry output be
Q = U({Qj}sj=1) as given by equation (3). Then, following De Loecker (2011),
denoting Rj = PjQj and lowercase variables with logs, we can derive from (9)
that
(10) rj − p = 1
η
q +
1
η
vj + α
∗kj + β∗lj + γ∗(mj − ρ) + γ∗aG(nj) + ω∗j ,
where star indicates that the coefficient is multiplied by (η − 1)/η, for example,
α∗ = α(η − 1)/η. The term on the left hand side is firm revenue normalized by
the industry price index. The first two terms on the right hand side come from
the demand system and correct for the fact that we express revenue rather than
quantity. The remaining terms on the right hand side have similar interpretation
as in (9), the difference being that they are now adjusted by the factor (η − 1)/η
to account for price effects.
Choosing the number of imported varieties. We now return to the choice of nj .
Let pi(n) denote expected operating profits (without subtracting the fixed costs
of importing) if the firm imports n goods. Here the expectation is over the only
source of residual uncertainty εj . Because of the constant elasticity of demand,
expected operating profits are a constant fraction of expected revenue, and can
be computed from (10).10 The optimal import decision of the firm is then
(11) nj = arg max
n˜
pi(n˜)−
n˜∑
i=1
f ij .
Imports augmenting productivity. It is natural to interpret equation (9) as
a production function for output in which the firm’s total factor productivity is
given by φj = aγG(nj)+ωj , i.e., the sum of the productivity gains from importing
and a “residual productivity” term. This interpretation is correct in the sense that
variation in φ measures differences in output for the same amount of resources
employed in the production process. But it ignores the fact that importing also
entails fixed costs which require resources. Thus φ is an (approximately) correct
measure of productivity only when the fixed costs are small relative to the overall
productivity gain. Because importing reduces marginal costs but requires the
payment of fixed costs, this is more likely to hold for medium and large firms
which import multiple different products.11 In the empirical analysis, we will
10For notational simplicity we suppress the dependence of pi on other firm-level variables such as k or
ωobs. We compute the profit function explicitly in Appendix A.
11For the last product the firm chooses to import, the fixed cost should be approximately the same as
the savings induced by importing that product. For every other—inframarginal—product that the firm
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show that—because the bulk of production and importing is performed by mid-
sized and large importers—on average in our data fixed costs are small relative to
the cost-savings generated by imports. Hence in practice little is lost by treating
φ as a measure of productivity, which is what we do below.
By a similar logic, it is natural to interpret (10) as a production function for
revenue. In this expression revenue productivity—defined as revenue minus the
contributions of capital, labor and intermediate inputs—equals φRj =
1
η q +
1
ηvj +
aγ∗G(nj) + ω∗j . Here the first two terms represent demand effects that influence
revenue conditional on the contributions of the factors of production. As with
quantity productivity above, here too little is lost by ignoring the role of fixed
costs.
III. Estimation
A. Assumptions
We now state assumptions about dynamics and heterogeneity which allow us to
estimate our static model in panel data. Consider a firm j in industry s, located
in county c, in year t. Recall that ωjt = ω
obs
jt +εjt, where ω
obs
jt is observable to the
firm at the beginning of period t. Following De Loecker (2011) we also assume
that the (log) within-industry demand shifter of firm j at time t can be written
as vjt = ψ0 + ψ · djt where djt is an observable demand shifter.
Building on Olley Pakes (1996) we assume that conditional on a vector of
state variables, the firm’s investment decision is a monotone function of observed
productivity ωobsjt . Formally, assume that Ijt = ξ(ω
obs
jt , kjt, ljt, zjt) where ξ is
increasing in its first argument. It is natural that investment should depend
on capital and labor, which are by assumption predetermined. We also allow
Ijt to depend on a vector of state variables zjt = (djt, q
s
t , s, t, c, ojt). Here djt
is the within-industry demand shifter and qst measures industry-level demand.
Both of these, as shown in Section II.B, affect the firm’s problem in period t.
Because demand or productivity might evolve differently by industry, year and
location, we also include s, t and c in zjt. Finally ojt denotes other potential
state variables which might also affect the firm’s investment decision (for example,
through differential access to finance). We always include in ojt an indicator for
whether the firm has been foreign owned.
The timing for firm j within period t is the following.
1) Observe ωobsjt .
2) Observe the vector of state variables zjt, decide whether to exit.
3) Decide on investment Ijt.
chooses to import, the fixed cost of importing is strictly lower than the cost-saving from lower marginal
costs, and this difference is increasing in firm size because larger firms gain more from a given reduction
in marginal cost.
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4) Observe the fixed costs of importing f¯jt, the wage w
s
t and the input price
index ρst .
5) Decide on the number of imported products njt and total material spending
mjt.
6) Observe εjt.
7) Produce output qjt and sell at a price determined by the demand curve.
8) Set lj,t+1.
We assume that the productivity shocks εjt are i.i.d. and independent of all
other shocks; that the fixed cost realizations f¯jt are i.i.d. and independent of all
other shocks conditional on zjt; and that the industry-level factor prices (w
s
t , ρ
s
t )
are independent of all other shocks and i.i.d. between industries and over time.
Thus, consistent with the assumption that it determines firm investment, the
vector (ωobsjt , kjt, ljt, zjt) fully characterizes the distribution of shocks facing firm
j in period t.
We also assume that the observed component of productivity can be written as
ωobsjt = µ(s, c, o)+$jt. Here the mean shifter µ(s, c, o) = µ
1
s+µ
2
c+µo ·o so that the
mean of ωobs can, through fixed effects, vary by industry and by county, and can
also depend linearly on the state variables in ojt. And $jt is a Markov process
satisfying $jt = f($j,t−1) + ejt where ejt are i.i.d. and independent of all other
shocks. Finally, we require that for all firms the process (ωobsjt , zjt) is Markov with
the same dynamics. It follows—again consistent with our assumption on the
investment function—that the current realization of (ωobsjt , zjt) fully determines
its distribution in future periods.12 Assumptions about the dynamics of shocks
similar to ours are frequently used in the productivity literature.
Our key variable of interest is the benefit of importing, measured by a. In the
estimation we assume that observations can be partitioned into groups based on
zjt—for example by ownership status or year—such that the quality advantage
of the foreign input A is constant for observations within a group, but may vary
across groups. An implication is that the per-product import gain a, and also the
import share measure S, will stay constant within, but vary across groups. We
let g = 1, ..., g¯ index groups.
Heterogeneity. Our framework allows for considerable heterogeneity. Firms can
differ in their productivity, factor use, foreign and domestic intermediate input
use, and also in their realized fixed costs. Crucially, we also permit heterogeneity
across inputs through the γi parameters. We do assume that the γi—essentially,
the G(·) function— are the same across firms. This assumption implies that
12De Loecker (2011) allows ωobsjt to also depend on dj,t−1, but does not include q
s
t in the vector of
state variables. In contrast, while we do not permit djt to directly affect productivity, we do allow for
persistence in the dynamics of djt and q
s
t and hence include both of them in zjt. These variables are
also included in the equation determining investment.
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additional varieties decline in importance identically across companies, but it does
not imply that firms in different industries use the same goods in production, or
that goods have the same production weight. For example, γ1, the share of the
most important input, is the same for all firms; but this share can be different from
γ2, and also, the identity of the most important good can vary across industries.
B. Estimating the import effect in a single group
We begin by describing our estimation strategy for the case in which all firms
have the same efficiency of import use A (that is, g¯ = 1). We will later discuss
how to extend the procedure when there are multiple groups with different values
of A.
We estimate our model using three equations. We use the empirical counterpart
of the import share equation (8) to estimate the G(n) function. We assume that
G(n) has the parametric functional form
(12) G(n) =
G¯
(
1−
[
1− (nn¯)λ]1/λ) if n ≤ n¯,
G¯ if n > n¯.
Here λ ∈ (0, 1) and G¯ ∈ (0, 1). This functional form yields a declining marginal
benefit of additional imports, which eventually—when n > n¯—completely levels
off. The import share equation (8) yields our first estimating equation
(13)
MFjt
Mjt
= S ·G(njt) + ujt
where G(n) is assumed to be given by the above function. Because the model
implies this relationship exactly, without an error term, we assume that ujt is
measurement error orthogonal to the number of imported inputs njt. We use this
equation to estimate the shape parameter λ and the import share coefficient S.
Our second estimating equation exploits the firm’s first order condition for
intermediate inputs to connect the coefficient γ with the material share in pro-
duction. Our use of this equation parallels the empirical approach of Gandhi,
Navarro Rivers (2013). Because materials are chosen after all shocks except for
ε∗jt are realized, profit maximization and the Cobb-Douglas production function
imply
(14) γ∗
Eε(Rjt)
Mjt
= 1
where Eε refers to expectations taken with respect to the uncertainty in εjt. We
use this equation to estimate γ∗.
Our third estimating equation comes from the revenue production function.
18 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Here the classic identification problem is that firm productivity ωobsjt can be cor-
related with other variables on the right hand side. We follow the Olley Pakes
(1996) approach in getting around this problem by inverting the monotone in-
creasing investment function ξ to get
ωobs∗jt = h(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt)
with an unknown h “control” function. Substituting this expression into (10),
denoting δ∗ = γ∗a, and using vjt = ψ0 + ψ · djt, we obtain our empirical import-
augmented production function
(15)
rjt−pst =
1
η
qst+
1
η
ψ0+
ψ
η
·djt+α∗kj+β∗lj+γ∗(mj−ρst )+δ∗G(nj)+h(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt)+ε∗jt.
Here again G(n) is assumed to be have the parametric form given by equation
(12). We use this equation to estimate the import coefficient δ∗ and the per-
product import gain a = δ∗/γ∗.
The following roadmap summarizes our empirical strategy of estimating these
three equations.
1) Estimate G(n) and S from firms’ import shares (13).
2) Estimate γ∗ from the material share (14).
3) Estimate a from (15) using the first step of the Olley-Pakes procedure.
4) Estimate α∗, β∗, η and ψ from (15) using the second step of the Olley-Pakes
procedure.
We now turn to describe each step in more detail.
Estimating G(n). Equation (13) links firms’ import shares to the parametric
G(n) function. Figure 1 plots the average import share of firms as a function of n.
Because few firms import many products we cannot precisely estimate the value
n¯ at which the curve flattens out, but the figure suggests that setting n¯ = 150
is a reasonable choice.13 We take G¯ from the input-output table as the share of
non-service inputs among all intermediate inputs. We then estimate the curvature
parameter λ and the import share S from (13) using a nonlinear least squares
regression. To ensure that total imports computed in our estimated model using
the estimated import shares aggregate up to total imports in the data, in this
regression we weight observations by real intermediate spending. The graph also
shows that the shape of our estimated G(n) closely tracks the relationship between
import share and the number of products.
13Setting other plausible values for n¯ had no effect on our qualitative results.
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Figure 1. Import share as a function of the number of imported products
Estimating the material coefficient γ∗. We estimate γ∗ from the sample ana-
logue of equation (14) as
γˆ∗ =
∑
j
∑
tMjt∑
j
∑
tRjt
which is the overall material share in the entire manufacturing sector.
Estimating the import effect using the first step of the Olley-Pakes approach.
Equation (15) includes the demand proxy djt. This variable governs—conditional
on industry demand qst—the distribution of market shares within the industry.
Exploiting spatial variation in demand, we proxy the demand shifter with local
demand growth in the county of the firm. We compute this measure as the log
growth in output of all firms (excluding j) in the year, industry, and county of
firm j.
Equation (15) also includes the unknown control function h(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt).
We approximate this function with the sum of (i) a third-order polynomial of
Ijt, kjt, ljt and the state variables ojt, with coefficients that are allowed to differ
by year; plus (ii) a linear function of industry by year effects, county effects, djt
and qst . These controls absorb several terms on the right hand side of equation
(15). Using our estimate of γ∗ to subtract γˆ∗(mjt−ρst ) from both sides we obtain
(16) rjt − pst − γ∗(mjt − ρst ) = h˜(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt) + δ∗G(nj) + ε∗jt.
where h˜(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt) denotes the nonparameteric control function which ab-
sorbs ωobsjt as well as the capital, labor and demand effects. Because at this stage
20 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
we already have an estimate of G(n), and because ε is orthogonal to all remaining
terms on the right hand side, we can estimate this equation with ordinary least
squares to infer δ∗. We then use the formula a = δ∗/γ∗ to estimate a.
Estimating the coefficients of state variables. Here we follow the second step of
the Olley-Pakes procedure with the following modifications. (1) In our specifica-
tion both kjt and ljt are predetermined, and productivity is also affected by the
potentially persistent variables in ojt. We estimate the coefficients of all of these
variables in the second step. (2) Our revenue production function involves both
qst and djt, both of which are plausibly persistent. We thus treat them as state
variables and estimate their coefficients in the second step. (3) Because we allow
ωobs to depend on industry and county effects, we also include these fixed effects
in the second step.
Standard errors. We obtain standard errors for all estimates from a bootstrap.
We explain the precise implementation of these steps in more detail in Appendix
B.
C. Logic of identification
The central identification problem associated with (9) is that ω is potentially
correlated with the other determinants of output, including G(n). We solve this
problem using the Olley and Pakes approach, making structural assumptions that
allow us to substitute out productivity. The identification of the import demand
equation also follows from structural assumptions, which restrict the functional
form on the right-hand side of (13). To see how natural threats to identification
are resolved, consider the concern that more productive firms both spend more
on imports and import a greater number of varieties, a mechanism which could
introduce spurious correlation between the share of imported inputs and G(n) in
(13). Importantly, our estimation is immune to this concern: productivity, which
is explicitly incorporated in the model, cancels out of (13) because the left hand
side is the share of imports in intermediate spending. While more productive
firms do import more, they also spend more on intermediate goods as a whole.
Given the homogenous production function, TFP drops out when we compute
the ratio of these quantities. In fact, our structural assumptions yield a version
of (13) which holds exactly, with no error term—this is why, given our model, u
should be interpreted as classical measurement error.
It is useful to understand the variation which identifies our key parameters.
Because we start with (13), the form of G(n) is determined as the shape traced
out by the import share when n varies. Given this shape, S and A are estimated
from the coefficients of G(n) in the import share equation and in the revenue
production function. Thus S and A are identified from variation in n given
controls. In effect, we compare the output of two equally productive firms who
import a different number of varieties. In the model, such variation in n comes
from variation in the fixed costs, which affect the optimal number of imported
inputs.
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As with all structural estimation, the validity of our identification is guaranteed
only if the model is correctly specified. One important possible misspecification
is that firms might differ in their efficiency of import use A. Such variation can
generate heterogeneity in S and a, which in turn can create correlation between u
and G(n) in (13). We partially address this concern by explicitly allowing A—and
hence a and S—to vary across groups of firms.
D. Recovering the quality and substitution parameters
Given our estimates of a and S we use the following two equations implied by
the model to infer the deep parameters θ and A:
θ = 1− log(1− S)
a
,(17)
logA = a
[
1− log S
log(1− S)
]
.(18)
The basic idea behind these equations is that that a high per-product import
gain a combined with a low import share S shows the importance of imperfect
substitution. By (17), for a given gain from importing a, a lower S implies a lower
θ: since importers are unwilling to switch to attractive foreign goods, the substi-
tution elasticity must be low. And by (18), the gap between the quality effect
logA and the total gain from imports a is a reflection of imperfect substitution,
which is related to the import share S by (17).14
E. Extension to multiple groups
When different groups of firms, indexed by g = 1, ..., g¯, have different efficiency
of import use Ag, the import share Sg and the the per-product import gain ag
become group specific. This change affects the import share equation (13) which
involves Sg and the revenue production function (15) which involves δ
∗
g = γ
∗ag.
Our estimation strategy follows the same steps as above, but we now jointly
estimate the group-specific parameters. Thus in estimating the import share
equation we continue to use non-linear least squares, but in a specification which
allows Sg to be group specific and requires that the shape of G(n) is the same
for all firms. Similarly, when estimating the revenue production function (15) we
continue to use ordinary least squares, but allow δg to be group specific. We use
this procedure to obtain preliminary estimates of ag and Sg.
We next refine these estimates using the restrictions of our structural model to
obtain our final, model-consistent estimates. To see why we do this, note that
14Our approach here builds on Feenstra (1994) and Broda Weinstein (2006). They express the
productivity (welfare) gain from variety as x1/(1−θ), where x < 1 is the new expenditure share of old
varieties. In our model, x = 1 − S and the productivity gain is exp(a) = (1 − S)1/(1−θ). Joaquin
Blaum, Claire Lelarge Michael Peters (2014) derive a similar formula for the gains from input trade in
a generalized version of our model in which firms can import from multiple countries.
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multiple groups also affect how we infer the quality and substitution parameters.
Because Ag and Sg are group-specific, (17) and (18) become a system of equations.
But because θ is the same for all firms, this system is over-identified. We therefore
estimate Ag and θ using our preliminary estimates of ag and Sg in a minimum
distance procedure in which we minimize the sum of squared deviations across
these equations. Then, given the deep parameters Ag and θ we invert equations
(17) and (18) to obtain our refined, internally consistent estimates of the reduced-
form parameters ag and Sg. These are the estimates we report in the tables below.
F. Fixed costs
To estimate fixed costs, we make the additional assumption that the firm’s
fixed cost schedule depends only on its ownership status and on an i.i.d. random
disturbance. Specifically, let the fixed cost of importing the n-th product by firm
j in year t be fnjt = exp(κ
D
n 1
D
jt +κ
F
n 1
F
jt +ϑjt). Here 1
F
jt is an indicator for the firm
having been foreign owned, 1Djt = 1 − 1Fjt; κFn and κDn measure the dependence
of the fixed cost schedule on n, separately for firms that have or have not been
foreign owned; and ϑjt is a shock that affects the entire fixed cost schedule. We
assume that ϑjt is mean-zero, normally distributed, and independent of all other
shocks, with a variance that may depend on the whether the firm has been foreign
owned.
Recall from equation (11) that the optimal choice of njt is determined by trading
off expected operating profits pi(n) with the fixed costs. Here pi(n) is a constant
fraction of expected revenue, and by equation (10) the random variable over
which expectations must be taken to compute it is exp(ε∗). We estimate this
expected value as a weighted average of exp(εˆ∗jt) within industry s and year t,
where εˆ∗jt is our estimate of the realized error term. We choose weights to ensure
that average expected revenue equals average actual revenue in each industry
and year. Combining this measure with our coefficient estimates and the revenue
production function (10) yields an empirical estimate of pijt(n) for each possible
value of n.
From (11) the optimal choice of n is characterized by the inequalities fnjt ≤
pi(n)− pi(n− 1) (for n ≥ 1) and fn+1jt > pi(n+ 1)− pi(n). Because we observe the
actual choice of njt for all firms, given that the assumed distribution of ϑjt in our
fixed cost model is normal, we can estimate this set of inequalities—separately
for firms that have and have not been foreign owned—as an ordered probit. This
allows us to infer the coefficients κFn , κ
D
n , and the standard deviations σ
F
ϑ and
σDϑ . These results yield an estimate for the distribution of the fixed cost vector
f¯ . While we cannot infer its precise value, from the observed njt we can derive
an interval bound on the realization of ϑjt. We then construct estimates for the
fixed cost schedule of each firm in each year by calculating the conditional mean
of the estimated distribution of ϑ within the interval bounds. This ensures that
the implied choice of njt agrees with the choice we observe in the data. We use
these estimates to compute summary statistics of the fixed costs, and also in the
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counterfactual analysis. We explain the precise implementation of the fixed cost
estimation in more detail in Appendix B.
IV. Results
A. Basic results
Table 3 summarizes our basic results. For the production function parameters
we report the “starred” values corresponding to the revenue production function,
for example, α∗ = α(η − 1)/η. From these, the quantity production function pa-
rameters can be recovered using our estimate of the demand elasticity η. Because
the dependent variable in the production function is log total sales, not value
added, the coefficients of capital and labor are smaller than in the more common
value-added specifications, while material costs have a large coefficient.
Column 1 reports the results from our empirical procedure in a baseline spec-
ification in which the vector of additional state variables ojt only includes an
indicator for whether the firm has been foreign owned, and all firms have the
same import quality parameter A. We estimate a highly significant per product
import gain a of 0.33. This point estimate implies that the composite of the
foreign and the domestic good is about exp(.33) − 1 = 39 percent more efficient
per dollar spent than the domestic good in itself. The share of non-service inputs
among all intermediate inputs from the input-output table is G¯ = 0.83, and in col-
umn 1 the elasticity of output to intermediate inputs is estimated to be γ∗ = 0.75.
Combining these numbers, we predict that if a non-importer starts importing all
tradeable varieties, it will experience an increase in log revenue productivity of
aG¯γ∗ = 0.20, which corresponds to an increase in revenue productivity of about
22 percent.
The table also reports our estimates of the structural parameters A and θ. In
the baseline specification, the price-adjusted quality advantage of foreign products
relative to their domestic counterparts is A = 1.19. Based on our bootstrap
(reported at the bottom of the table) this value value is different from 1 with
p = 0.004. Imported inputs are thus about 19 percent better than domestic
ones per dollar of expenditure. This difference in price-adjusted quality accounts
for about 48 percent of the per-product import gain. The remaining 52 percent
comes from imperfect substitution: we find that the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods is θ = 4. The basic empirical fact underlying
the importance of imperfect substitution is that, in spite of the large gain from
imports, the difference in the import share of firms who purchase more versus
fewer foreign varieties is modest.
The table also reports estimates of the demand terms. The coefficient of in-
dustry log sales (qst ) is 0.066, the inverse of which gives our estimate of the con-
sumer’s elasticity of substitution η = 15. Our estimate is towards the high end
of the range of elasticities reported in Broda Weinstein (2006), and higher than
De Loecker’s estimates which range between 3 and 7. In particular, our estimate
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Table 3—Baseline estimates
Baseline Conditioning on Conditioning on Conditioning on
exporter past imports lagged G(n)
Dependent variable: log sales (1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital  (α*)
0.041
(0.003)
0.041
(0.003)
0.040
 (0.003)
0.038
 (0.004)
Labor (β*)
0.198
 (0.008)
0.197
 (0.008)
0.201
 (0.008)
0.215
 (0.015)
Materials (γ*)
0.752
 (0.012)
0.752
(0.012)
0.752
(0.012)
0.752
 (0.012)
Per-product import gain (a)
0.327
 (0.063)
0.263
 (0.058)
0.194
(0.053)
0.164
 (0.055)
Import share (S)
0.626
 (0.055)
0.626
 (0.055)
0.626
 (0.055)
0.626
 (0.055)
Efficiency of imports (A)
1.186
 (0.076)
1.147
(0.061)
1.107
(0.047)
1.089
 (0.042)
Elasticity of substitution (θ)
4.006
[3.05; 6.07]
4.742
[3.52; 8.00]
6.053
[4.14; 12.92]
7.002
[4.45; 26.13]
Curvature of G(n) (λ)
0.650
 (0.055)
0.650
 (0.055)
0.650
 (0.055)
0.650
 (0.055)
Foreign owned
0.054
 (0.013)
0.067
 (0.010)
0.067
 (0.010)
0.073
 (0.126)
Exporter
0.046
 (0.005)
0.046
 (0.005)
0.052
 (0.006)
Previous importer
-0.002
(0.006)
Lagged per-product import gain
0.120
 (0.045)
Industry sales (log)
0.066
 (0.013)
0.066
 (0.013)
0.031
(0.012)
0.076
 (0.020)
Local demand growth
0.009
(0.006)
0.010
 (0.006)
0.012
 (0.005)
0.013
 (0.007)
p-value of test for a=0 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.016
p-value of test for A=1 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Observations 127,472 127,472 127,472 127,472
Notes: All specifications use the structural estimation procedure of Section 4. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm are
in parenthesis. For the elasticity of substitution (theta) we report a 95 percent confidence interval computed the same way in
brackets.
implies that the markup firms charge is about 6.7 percent of the price of the final
good. We can use η to compute the parameters of the quantity production func-
tion. For example, our estimates imply that if a non-importer starts importing
all tradeable varieties, it will experience an increase in log quantity productiv-
ity of aG¯γ · η/(η − 1) = 0.22, i.e., an increase in quantity productivity of 25
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percent. The table also shows that the coefficient of local demand growth–our
demand shifter—is a positive and significant 0.009. As expected, an increase in
local demand maps into higher firm sales.
Column 2 re-estimates the model by also adding to the state variable vector
ojt an indicator for export market participation. The reason is to distinguish
the effect of imports from the “international engagement” of the firm, and to
control for linkages between importing and exporting such as those emphasized
by Kasahara Lapham (2008). The import estimates are somewhat smaller but
similar to the previous specification (a = 0.26, A = 1.15), suggesting that our
procedure succeeds in isolating the impact of imports on productivity.
Columns 3 and 4 explore the possibility that entering import markets entails
a sunk, rather than a fixed cost. One variant of this hypothesis is that starting
to import requires a sunk cost, but then importing additional varieties requires a
per-period cost. To capture this force, in column 3 we include in ojt an indicator
for the past importing status of the firm. The estimated coefficients (a = 0.19
and A = 1.11) are smaller but still show a significant import effect.
In column 4 we explore another variant of the sunk cost hypothesis: that im-
porting each additional variety requires a sunk cost. In this case the set of pre-
viously imported inputs becomes a state variable. To capture this mechanism,
we include γG(nj,t−1) in ojt. The estimated coefficients (a = 0.16 and A = 1.09)
continue to show a significant import effect. Moreover, importing a good now also
changes the set of available foreign goods and hence imports have dynamic effects
on productivity. A simple way to measure these effects is with the coefficient
of γG(nj,t−1).15 This coefficient estimate shows that the “lagged per-product
import gain” is 0.12. Combining this number with the (unlagged) per product
import gain a, importing a product for two years would increase productivity by
exp(0.12 + 0.164)− 1 = 33 percent times the product’s cost share.
The basic finding that imports have a positive productivity effect confirms and
reinforces existing evidence from Indonesia Amiti Konings (2007), Chile Kasahara
Rodrigue (2008) and India Topalova Khandelwal (2011). Our substantial per-
product import gain estimates support the analysis of Gopinath Neiman (2013)
who argue that the large drop in the number of inputs firms imported during
a crisis in Argentina may have contributed to the observed decline in aggregate
productivity.
A robust finding in columns 1-4 of the Table is that imperfect substitution is
responsible for about half (between 48 and 52 percent) of the gains from import-
ing. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Goldberg et al. (2009) who
show, in micro data from India, that firms combine foreign and domestic varieties
to increase their product scope. Our results imply that combining these inputs
also raises productivity. And our empirical finding that imperfect substitution
amplifies the effect of higher quality inputs (i.e., that a > logA) parallels theoret-
15We look at the coefficient of γG(nj,t−1) rather than that of G(nj,t−1) to ensure that the coefficient
is measured in the same units as a, which is the coefficient of γG(nj,t).
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ical arguments that complementarities between inputs can generate large income
differences across countries. As Jones (2011) explains: “high productivity in a
firm requires a high level of performance along a large number of dimensions.
Textile producers require raw materials, knitting machines, a healthy and trained
labor force, knowledge of how to produce, security, business licenses, transporta-
tion networks, electricity, etc. These inputs enter in a complementary fashion, in
the sense that problems with any input can substantially reduce overall output.
Without electricity or production knowledge or raw materials or security or busi-
ness licenses, production is likely to be severely curtailed.” Our findings provide
evidence for this sort of interdependence in the context of combining foreign and
domestic intermediate inputs.
B. Foreign ownership and the efficiency of import use
Firms that had been foreign owned played a very important role in the Hun-
garian economy. In our data the sales share of such firms in the manufacturing
sector increased from 21 to 80 percent during 1992-2003. Moreover, across spec-
ifications in Table 3, firms that have been foreign owned are on average about 7
percent more productive than purely domestic firms, suggesting that growing for-
eign participation has had significant aggregate productivity effects in Hungary.
A possibility is that foreign firms are more productive in part because the they use
imports more efficiently. Indeed, these firms may have better access to low-cost
input suppliers abroad, may have more extensive know-how about foreign goods,
and may face lower transactions costs.
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Figure 2. Import share for domestic and foreign firms
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Table 4—The gains from importing for foreign and domestic firms
Baseline
Conditioning on Conditioning on Conditioning on
exporter past imports lagged G(n)
Dependent variable:
log sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Capital (α*)
0.041
(0.003)
0.041
 (0.003)
0.040
 (0.003)
0.039
 (0.005)
Labor (β*)
0.199
 (0.008)
0.196
 (0.008)
0.201
 (0.008)
0.214
(0.019)
Materials (γ*)
0.752
 (0.012)
0.752
 (0.012)
0.752
 (0.012)
0.752
 (0.012)
Per-product import
gain (a)
0.271
 (0.063)
0.390
(0.068)
0.213
 (0.057)
0.314
(0.063)
0.156
(0.052)
0.224
 (0.059)
0.126
 (0.062)
0.159
 (0.064)
Import share (S)
0.490
 (0.052)
0.621
 (0.042)
0.486
 (0.052)
0.625
 (0.045)
0.490
(0.049)
0.621
(0.048)
0.515
 (0.059)
0.596
(0.053)
Efficiency of
imports (A)
0.984
 (0.083)
1.220
 (0.072)
0.982
 (0.066)
1.178
 (0.061)
0.991
(0.046)
1.121
 (0.048)
1.010
(0.048)
1.071
(0.042)
Elasticity of
substitution (θ)
3.484
 [2.753;5.004]
4.118
 [3.135;6.712]
5.323
[3.758;10.919]
6.719
 [4.083;66.082]
Curvature of G(n)
(λ)
0.650
 (0.055)
0.650
 (0.055)
0.650
 (0.055)
0.650
 (0.054)
Lagged per-product
import gain (a)
-0.087
 (0.055)
0.306
 (0.095)
Foreign owned
0.066
(0.015)
0.061
 (0.014)
0.066
 (0.012)
0.028
 (0.077)
Exporter
0.045
 (0.006)
0.046
 (0.005)
0.052
 (0.006)
Previous importer
-0.002
 (0.006)
Industry sales
0.066
(0.013)
0.066
 (0.013)
0.032
 (0.012)
0.070
(0.020)
Local demand
growth
0.010
(0.006)
0.010
(0.006)
0.012
 (0.005)
0.012
 (0.007)
p-value of test for
 a=0 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.219
p-value of test for
 A=1 0.777 0.004 0.733 0.004 0.777 0.004 0.897 0.046
p-value of test for
 a1=a2 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.269
Observations 127,472 127,472 127,472 127,472
Notes: All specifications use the structural estimation procedure of Section 4. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm are
in parenthesis. For the elasticity of substitution (theta) we report a 95 percent confidence interval computed the same way in
brackets.
To explore this possibility, we implement our estimation procedure with two
groups (g¯ = 2), allowing firms that have and have not been foreign owned to have
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different efficiency of import use A. Maintaining the assumption that firms use
the same technology, the elasticity of substitution θ is held constant across all
firms. We begin with Figure 2, which separately plots the average import share
for domestic and foreign firms, together with the estimated Sg · G(n) function.
This figure shows that the shape of G(n) matches reasonably well the empirical
import shares in both groups. Moreover, consistent with Fact 1, foreign firms
have a higher import share conditional on the number of imported products.
We then turn to Table 4 which reports the regression results. The first speci-
fication shows a large and significant difference in the per-product import gain.
We obtain a = 0.39 for foreign and a = 0.27 for domestic companies, which come
from differential ability of import use: we estimate A = 1.22 for foreign and
A = 0.98, not significantly different from one, for domestic firms. These results
imply that domestic companies benefit from imports primarily through imperfect
substitution.16
The second specification adds the firm’s exporter status to the vector of state
variables ojt. The qualitative results are as before: domestic firms are not better
at using imported inputs than at using domestic inputs (AD = 0.98), while foreign
firms are (AF = 1.18). The third specification also adds an indicator for past
importing to the vector of state variables. Results are essentially unchanged. In
the last specification, we also allow the lag of G(n) to be a state variable. The
per product import gain estimates are aD = 0.13 and aF = 0.16. This difference
is smaller than before. However, the lagged per product import gain is much
larger for foreign firms. Hence the long-run import gain—the sum of the current
and the lagged per product gain—is significantly larger for foreign (0.41) than for
domestic firms (0.11). We conclude that the efficiency advantage in using imports
of firms that have been foreign owned is robust across specifications.
From a policy perspective it is important to understand whether their greater
efficiency in import use A is caused by these firms having been foreign-owned, or
is due to other mechanisms such as selection, whereby foreign investors purchase
firms which are better at using imports. To explore this question, we look for
changes in the efficiency of import use in firms whose ownership status changes
during our sample period (“switcher firms”). In our sample there are 656 firms
which switch from being domestically owned to being foreign owned. For each
of these firms, using the baseline estimates from column 1 of Table 3, we com-
pute residual quantity productivity as ωˆjt = ωˆ
∗
jtηˆ/(ηˆ − 1), and residual revenue
productivity as ωˆ∗jt +
1
ηˆ qst +
ψˆ
ηˆ djt. We calculate these measures as a function
of event year, normalizing the date on which the firm becomes foreign-owned to
zero, separately for firms that do import versus firms that do not import in that
event year.
16As discussed in Section III.E the model-consistent estimates of ag and Sg are filtered through the
structural model of imperfect substitution and hence not equal to their preliminary (direct) estimates.
But they are close: for example, aF = 0.39 versus a
′
F = 0.38 and aD = 0.27 versus a
′
D = 0.29 in the
model-consistent respectively in the preliminary estimates.
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Figure 3 plots the difference between importers and and non-importers by event
year, normalizing the difference to zero in the year before the acquisition, both for
quantity and for revenue productivity. The Figure shows that after acquisition,
both the quantity and the revenue productivity gap between importers and non-
importers widens. The gap peaks at about 4 percentage points for both measures
in year 2 after the acquisition. The p-value that the gap widens is 0.11 for
quantity and 0.06 for revenue productivity. These results are not fully conclusive,
but they do suggest that part of the foreign premium in the efficiency of import
use is causal. This in turn suggests a potential policy complementarity between
financial and trade liberalization which we explore in Section V below.
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Figure 3. Productivity premium of importers around foreign acquisition
C. Import effects by year and industry
To explore the robustness of our estimates and learn more about the impact
of foreign goods, we next explore variation in the import effect over time. We
estimate our model allowing for eight groups of firms (g¯ = 8) with potentially
different efficiency of import use A. The groups are defined by whether the firm
has been foreign owned, and by the three-year periods 1992-94, 1995-97, 1998-
2000, and 2001-03. Table 5 reports the estimated Ag values. Our estimates are
slightly noisier than before. But, consistent with the earlier findings, throughout
the sample period imports have had a significant effect on productivity, and firms
that have been foreign owned have been better in using imports. We will use
these estimates to decompose productivity growth during 1993-2002 in Hungary
into import-related and other channels in Section V below.
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Table 5—The gains from importing over time
Time period
1992-94 1995-97 1998-00 2001-03
Domestic firms
Per-product import gain (a) 0.301
(0.092)
0.287
 (0.069)
0.244
(0.057)
0.314
 (0.069)
Import share (S) 0.513
 (0.072)
0.497
 (0.058)
0.443
 (0.060)
0.529
 (0.065)
Efficiency of imports (A) 1.022
 (0.126)
0.996
 (0.095)
0.909
 (0.099)
1.049
 (0.110)
Foreign firms
Per-product import gain (a) 0.332
 (0.089)
0.459
 (0.092)
0.401
 (0.072)
0.364
 (0.072)
Import share (S) 0.548
 (0.064)
0.667
 (0.058)
0.617
 (0.057)
0.582
 (0.055)
Efficiency of imports (A) 1.084
 (0.118)
1.337
 (0.130)
1.221
 (0.102)
1.148
 (0.097)
p-value of domestic A=1 0.319 0.695 0.978 0.646
p-value of domestic A=previous column 0.420 0.424 0.214
p-value of foreign A=1 0.186 0.004 0.004 0.020
p-value of foreign A=previous column 0.113 0.404 0.271
Observations 127,472
Notes: Table reports estimates of a single regression. Different coefficients for the
productivity gain from importing (a), import share (S) and efficiency of imports (A) are
estimated for foreign and domestic firms in each 3-year period using the structural procedure
of Section 4. Other parameters are assumed to remain constant. Bootstrapped standard errors
clustered by firm are in parenthesis.
Table 6—The gains from importing by industry
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We also examine how the import effect varies by industry. Because different
industries might face different production possibilities and different market struc-
tures, we re-estimate our baseline specification separately for each of the 9 ISIC
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industries in which there are more than 5,000 firm-year observations. We allow
for different capital, labor and material coefficients as well as a different G(n)
and different Olley-Pakes proxy functions for each industry. Because sectors dif-
fer substantially in the set of products they use, we also set by sector the value
of n at which G(n) reaches its maximum to be the 99th percentile of the number
of imported products among all importers in that sector.
Table 6 reports our estimates of the key model parameters by industry.17 Be-
cause each industry has a smaller number of observations, the estimates are nois-
ier, but the table confirms the main patterns identified earlier. Imports have a
significantly positive productivity effect in all 9 industries; and imperfect substi-
tution is responsible for 42 percent of these gains on average. These results also
highlight how the deep parameters are determined by our coefficient estimates.
For example, the fabricated metal and the machinery industries have similar per-
product import gains of 0.36 respectively 0.35. But because in the fabricated
metal industry the import share is larger (54 percent versus 46 percent), our
model implies a higher elasticity of substitution in that industry (3.2 versus 2.7).
Intuitively, given the total advantage of foreign goods, a higher import share must
come from greater substitutability.
D. Fixed costs
Table 7 reports summary statistics for the estimated fixed costs. This table uses
the first specification in Table 4 which distinguishes the efficiency of import use
for firms that have and have not been foreign owned. The top panel reports the
median estimated fixed cost of importing the first product (f1jt) in four groups of
observations: domestic nonimporters, domestic importers, foreign nonimporters
and foreign importers. Importers have a much lower fixed cost, implying that
there is selection into importing. Consistent with the idea that they have better
connections with international suppliers, firms that have been foreign owned have
lower fixed costs.
The bottom panel of the table reports the median cost of importing the next—
that is, the njt + 1st—product, separately for domestic and foreign importers.
Unlike what we saw in the top panel, this cost is higher for foreign importers.
The reason for the difference can be understood by looking at Figure 4 which plots
the estimated fixed cost schedule (setting the firm-level disturbance ϑjt = 0) as a
function of n separately for firms that have and have not been foreign owned. Both
schedules are increasing, but the one for foreign firms is below that for domestic
firms. Consistent with the top panel in the table, for any given n foreign firms
find it cheaper to import the n-th product. But because of the lower costs and
the higher gain A they choose a higher n. Hence, consistent with the bottom
panel in the table, firms that have been foreign owned face a higher fixed cost for
the next product they could be importing.
17Significance levels are indicated by stars for the per-product import gain a and for the efficiency of
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Figure 4. Fixed cost schedule of domestic and foreign firms
It is helpful to understand the raw fact in the data that drives these findings.
The fixed costs are estimated from the comovement between the model-implied
gains from importing (which is related to firm size, A, and other factors) and the
number of imported varieties n. The key fact is that n increases more steeply
in the gain for foreign firms. Our structural model interprets this to show that
foreign firms have lower fixed costs of importing.
Table 7—Fixed costs
Domestic Foreign
Cost of importing first product ($)
Nonimporter 35,938 14,890
Importer 1,097 556
Cost of importing next product ($)
4,165 6,429
Notes: Table reports the estimated median fixed costs of importing a good
in 1998 US dollars, separately for domestic and foreign firms.
Finally, we measure the extent to which accounting for fixed costs might affect
our productivity estimates. As we discussed in Section II.B, aγG(n) is the proper
measure of the productivity gain from importing only when fixed costs are ignored.
To measure the quantitative importance of fixed import costs, we compute, in
the baseline specification, the average among all importers of their estimated
fixed cost expenditures relative to their total production costs. We obtain 2.2
imports A.
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percent. In contrast, the average cost increase if firms produced the same output
without the use of imports, is, across all importers, 19 percent of production costs.
Thus fixed costs amount to less than 12 percent of the cost savings created by
imports. Ignoring them does not substantially alter the aggregate implications of
our model.
V. Applications
This section develops two applications of our estimates. In Section V.A we
quantify the aggregate productivity effects of imports in Hungary, and in Section
V.B we explore the implications of tariff policies in our estimated economy.
A. Decomposing the productivity gains in Hungary
We decompose the growth in manufacturing productivity into various chan-
nels. To separate out the contribution of foreign ownership, we write a firm’s
residual log revenue productivity as ω∗jt = 1
F
jtµ
F
ω + χjt. Here 1
F
jt is an indicator
for whether the firm has been foreign owned, µFω is the Hicks-neutral mean log
revenue productivity premium of foreign firms, and χjt measures remaining vari-
ation in revenue productivity, including demand effects. Also taking into account
the effect of imports, the (log) revenue productivity of firm j in year t is
φRjt = [1
F
jt · aFt + 1Djt · aDt] · γ∗G(njt) + 1FjtµFω + χjt
where aFt and aDt denote the per product import gain in year t for firms that
have and have not been foreign owned, and 1Djt = 1− 1Fjt. Following Olley Pakes
(1996), we measure aggregate TFP as the sales-weighted average of firms’ log
TFP
(19) ΦRt =
∑
i
σjtφ
R
jt,
where σjt is the output share of firm j in year t. Denoting by G˜
D
t and G˜
F
t the
sales-weighted average of G(njt) and by σ
D
t and σ
F
t the sales share of domestic
and foreign firms in year t, simple algebra shows that the growth in aggregate
productivity between time t and time 0 equals
ΦRt − ΦR0 = [(aDt − aD0)γ∗σD0 G˜D0 + (aFt − aF0)γ∗σF0 G˜F0 ]
+ [aDtγ
∗σD0 (G˜
D
t − G˜D0 ) + aFtγ∗σF0 (G˜Ft − G˜F0 )]
+ [aDtγ
∗(σDt − σD0 )G˜Dt + aFtγ∗(σFt − σF0 )G˜Ft ]
+ µFω (σ
F
t − σF0 ) +
∑
j
(σjtχjt − σj0χj0)
 .
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The five terms on the right-hand side have the following intuitive interpretation.
The first two terms measure firm-level gains from imports, created by an increase
in the price-adjusted quality of imports (first term) and an increase in the number
of varieties imported (second term). The third term reflects aggregate-level gains
due to the increase in the share of foreign firms, which are more effective at using
imports. Taken together, these terms represent the productivity gains created by
importing. The fourth term measures the direct effect of increased foreign pres-
ence, caused by µFω , residual productivity premium of firms that have been foreign
owned. And the final term measures additional, non-import-related variation in
productivity. Note that in this decomposition firms that become foreign are as-
signed a higher efficiency of import use and a higher residual productivity. Thus
the decomposition assumes that these gains are caused by foreign ownership.
We use the above expression to decompose productivity growth in Hungary. To
smooth out business-cycle fluctuations and ensure a large number of observations,
we use all firm-year observations in the three-year range 1992-1994 as our “starting
date” and similarly all observations during 2001-03 as our “ending date,” but
interpret the results as a decomposition for 1993-2002. We use the coefficient
estimates from the specification reported in Table 5. Although the specification
in Table 5 is estimated in our main sample, because our goal is to compute
trends over time, we compute the decomposition in the firm-level sample defined
in Section I.A. Specifically, we calculate ω∗jt for each firm-year (of the firm-level
sample) during 1992-94 as well as during 2001-03 from the revenue production
function (10) and the coefficients in Table 5. Similarly, we calculate the various
sales shares and averages of G(n) in the firm-level sample for all observations in
1992-94 as well as 2001-03.
The results are summarized in Table 8. Our numbers imply that the total
growth in revenue productivity in the manufacturing sector in Hungary during
this period was 21.1 percent. More than a quarter of this growth, 5.9 percent, can
be attributed to various import-related mechanisms. Import-related gains at the
firm level generated a productivity gain of 4.7 percent, most of which, 4 percent,
comes from more firms importing more kinds of products. This result confirms
the quantitative significance of the “new goods margin” also emphasized in the
context of product scope by Goldberg et al. (2009). The more efficient use of
imports by an increasingly foreign-owned manufacturing sector adds another 1.2
percent, highlighting the substantial aggregate effect of the interaction between
foreign capital and importing. These large numbers indicate that imports were a
significant contributor to economic growth in Hungary.18
18The remaining 15.2 percent of productivity growth is due to factors unrelated to importing. Higher
foreign presence had a substantial direct effect by virtue of foreign firms being more productive; and we
also find a 13 percent increase caused by forces outside our analysis.
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Table 8—Productivity growth in the Hungarian manufacturing sector 1993-2002
Growth in aggregate productivity (percent) 21.1
Coming from intensive margin of imports 0.7
extensive margin of imports 4.0
increased import by foreign firms 1.2
direct effect of foreign firms 2.2
other 13.0
Notes: Total productivity growth between the periods 1992-94 and 2001-
03, interpreted as growth from 1993 to 2002, decomposed into the
contributions of five different margins.
B. Tariff effects
Motivated by the large aggregate effects of importing, we now turn to explore
how economic policies affect import-related productivity gains. Our main focus
is on the effect of tariff cuts. A reduction in tariffs directly increases productivity
by reducing the price of imports and thereby increasing price-adjusted quality A.
It also indirectly increases productivity by increasing the number of varieties the
firm chooses to import. Our goal is to understand how the magnitude of these
gains depends on the economic environment and on other concurrent economic
policies.
Model economy. We simulate tariff cuts in a static partial equilibrium economy
constructed based on the data and our estimates. Firms behave as in our the-
oretical model, with technology parameters (in most experiments) given by the
coefficients in the first specification of Table 4. In particular, firms that have been
foreign owned are more effective in using imports and also have higher residual
productivity. The population of firms in the model economy is the union of all
firm-year observations in our main sample.
To each firm we assign its actual capital, labor, foreign status, demand shifter
and estimated ωobs and ε. To each firm we also assign a fixed cost schedule
realization, which we take to be a random draw from the estimated distribution
of fixed costs, conditional on the interval bounds that ensure that the firm would
optimally choose to import the observed number of imported varieties.19 All
firms face the same input prices, which we set exogenously to match aggregate
output in each sector in each year. We then let firms make their optimal decisions
about materials, imports, and the price of their final good, respecting the timing
assumptions we had made in Section III.
In the counterfactual experiments we track aggregate outcomes as firms’ op-
timal choices change in response to changes in the environment. Because input
prices are exogenous our experiments ignore general equilibrium price effects; and
because capital and labor are exogenous they ignore dynamic considerations. We
19We use a random draw rather than the mean conditional on the interval bounds to make the
distribution of fixed costs in the model economy smooth.
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make these assumptions to keep the analysis simple and transparent.20 Endo-
genizing capital and labor would likely amplify the effects we document due to
reallocation. We describe the precise implementation of the counterfactual ex-
periments in more detail in Appendix C.
Tariff policy. We first study the effects of a uniform input tariff change of size
τ , which changes the price of all foreign inputs by a factor of (1 + τ) relative
to the benchmark economy. For example, τ = 0 is our benchmark model, while
τ = 0.1 corresponds to a tariff increase of ten percentage points. In our partial
equilibrium setting, the tariff change affects the economy by altering the price-
adjusted import quality A for both domestic and foreign firms.
Table 9—Counterfactual experiments
Panel A
Tariff reduction
(percent)
No firms
foreign
(percent)
Baseline
(percent)
All firms
foreign
(percent)
40 to 30 0.8 1.3 1.6
10 to 0 1.6 2.5 2.9
Panel B
Tariff reduction
(percent)
High fixed
cost
(percent)
Baseline
(percent)
Low fixed
cost
(percent)
40 to 30 1.2 1.3 1.5
10 to 0 2.2 2.5 2.7
Notes: Table reports changes in aggregate TFP in our simulated
economy in response to a 10 percentage point tariff reduction under
various scenarios. High fixed costs are 3 times the baseline and low
fixed costs are 1/3 of the baseline for each firm in the simulated
economy.
Table 9 computes the change in aggregate productivity that results from a 10
percentage point reduction in tariffs in several hypothetical scenarios. Panel A
focuses on the combination of decreasing tariffs and liberalizing FDI. The three
columns correspond to environments which differ in the share of foreign-owned
firms. In the first column we assume no firms are foreign, the second column is
our benchmark economy, and in the third column we assume all firms are foreign.
In keeping with the construction of the model economy, when we change the
foreign status of a firm, we change its efficiency of using imports A, adjust its log
fixed cost schedule by the mean difference in log fixed cost schedules of foreign
and domestic firms, and adjust its Hicks neutral log productivity by the foreign
productivity premium.
The middle column in Panel A shows that the effect of a tariff cut is nonlinear.
As the first row shows, a tariff reduction from 40 percent to 30 percent increases
aggregate productivity by 1.3 percent. In contrast, as the second row shows, a
20The partial equilibrium approach can be justified if the policies we evaluate affect a small industry
in a small open economy.
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tariff reduction from 10 percent to 0 percent increases aggregate productivity by
2.5 percent. That tariff cuts have larger effects in a more open economy may seem
surprising, but the underlying intuition is straightforward. A marginal reduction
in tariffs increases productivity by reducing the cost of foreign inputs; and this
cost reduction is higher when more firms use more kinds of foreign inputs. This
logic also implies that larger cuts have a more-than proportional effect on log
productivity, because they also increase the set of imported goods on which the
associated cost-savings occur.
Comparing across columns in Panel A also reveals a policy complementarity
between FDI liberalization and trade liberalization. When no firms are foreign,
reducing tariffs from 40 percent to 30 percent has a 0.8 percent productivity effect.
When all firms are foreign, the same tariff cut has a 1.6 percent productivity effect.
This complementarity emerges because foreign firms are more effective in using
imports. As the second row shows, this complementarity is slightly stronger in a
more open economy.
Panel B of Table 9 focuses on the combination of decreasing tariffs and changing
the fixed costs—such as those associated with licensing—of importing.21 In the
high fixed cost column each firm is assigned three times its baseline fixed cost
vector; in the middle column each firm is assigned its baseline fixed cost vector;
and in the low fixed cost column each firm is assigned one-third of its baseline
fixed cost vector.22
We find that tariff effects are larger with lower fixed costs. In the first row, a
tariff cut from 40 percent to 30 percent increases productivity by 1.2 percent in the
high fixed cost environment, and by 1.5 percent in the low-fixed-cost environment.
In a more open economy, these effects are larger. In the second row, a tariff cut
from 10 percent to zero increases productivity by 2.2 percent in the high fixed
cost environment, and by 2.7 percent in the low-fixed-cost environment. These
results point at a policy complementarity between reducing tariffs and reducing
the fixed costs of importing, and suggest that this complementarity is stronger in
a more open economy.
Our results about policy complementarities, which we obtained using only Hun-
garian data, seem broadly consistent with the liberalization experience of the
1990s in India. Consistent with the fixed cost complementarity, tariff cuts in In-
dia, which were accompanied by dismantling substantial non-tariff barriers, lead
to rapid growth in new imported varieties Goldberg et al. (2009) and an in-
crease in firm productivity Topalova Khandelwal (2011). And consistent with
the FDI complementarity, these effects were stronger in industries with higher
FDI liberalization Topalova Khandelwal (2011).
21In related work, Cec´ılia Hornok Miklo´s Koren (2015) explore the effect of changing fixed costs on
trade flows.
22In the absence of direct evidence on how liberalization affects fixed costs, our scenarios are motivated
by broad patterns in the World Bank’s Doing Business survey. In the average OECD country, it takes
14 days to start a new business and 11 days to import a standard containerized cargo. These time costs
are about three times as high, 45 days and 38 days, respectively, in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Import substitution. Finally we explore the effect of tariffs on the demand for
domestic intermediate goods. Our goal here is to contrast the implications of
the quality and imperfect substitution mechanisms. For simplicity we perform
this analysis in a model in which foreign and domestic firms use imports equally
efficiently, taking the parameters from column 1 of Table 3. We analyze tariff
effects in the following three scenarios. (1) Foreign and domestic goods are perfect
substitutes: the benefit of importing is entirely due to (price-adjusted) quality.
(2) Foreign and domestic goods have the same price-adjusted quality: the benefit
of imports is entirely due to imperfect substitution. (3) As in our baseline results,
about 52 percent of the gains are due to imperfect substitution. We implement
these scenarios by holding fixed the per-product import gain a = 0.33, and by
adjusting A and θ for the different scenarios. For instance, in the first scenario
we set θ = 20 which implies effectively perfect substitution, and let A = exp(a).
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Figure 5. Effect of tariff changes on domestic input demand
Figure 5 plots, as a function of the tariff level, the log dollar value of domestic
input use in these scenarios. Values are measured relative to the baseline model
with zero tariffs. Begin with the curve corresponding to the first scenario, in
which the import effect comes only from quality differences. In this case domestic
import demand is initially flat and then rapidly increasing. In contrast, the
curve corresponding to no quality differences has a uniform small slope. This
difference is intuitive: when foreign goods are perfect substitutes, there exists a
range in which small price changes bring about large import substitution. Because
our estimates assign a large role to imperfect substitution, the middle curve,
corresponding to the empirically estimated composition of the two channels, is
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also relatively flat. This curve also reflects the effect that the losses caused by
the tariff cut are counteracted by increased demand for all inputs created by
the productivity gains from importing. A key lesson from the figure is that the
magnitude of redistributive losses due to import substitution depend strongly
on the extent of substitution and on the initial level of tariffs. More broadly,
identifying the specific mechanism driving the effect of trade policies is useful in
that it helps evaluate the impact of these policies in other dimensions.
VI. Conclusion
This paper explored the effect of imports on productivity by estimating a struc-
tural model of importers in a panel of Hungarian firms. We found that imports
have a significant and large effect on firm productivity, about half of which is due
to imperfect substitution between foreign and domestic goods. We also found
that foreign firms use imports more effectively and pay lower fixed import costs.
We then used our estimates in combination with our structural model to conduct
counterfactual analysis. This analysis showed that during 1993-2002, a third of
the productivity growth in Hungary was due to imported inputs. It also showed
that the productivity gain from a tariff cut is larger when the economy has many
importers and many foreign firms, implying policy complementarities between
tariff cuts, dismantling non-tariff barriers, and FDI liberalization.
Perhaps the main caveat to our analysis is that, in the absence of exogenous
variation, we need to use with full force the restrictions imposed by our structural
framework. However, a benefit of our structural framework is that it allows for
explicit counterfactual analysis. Our framework and analysis may be extended
in a number of ways. One possibility is to seek reduced-form evidence for our
new predictions, such as those concerning policy complementarities. A second
direction is to use our formal model to examine concrete episodes—such as crises,
as explored by Gopinath Neiman (2013)—in which the imported goods margin
is relevant. A third direction is to extend our framework to also incorporate
capital goods. Work by Francesco Caselli Daniel J. Wilson (2004) suggests
that, because of the technology embedded in them, capital imports can have a
substantial effects on productivity. Investigating these directions can improve our
understanding of the link between international trade and economic growth.
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Proofs
A1. Deriving the revenue production function
Demand. Constrained maximization of the utility function (3) implies
(A1) Q1/ηV
1/η
j Q
−1/η
j = λPj
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. Multiplying by
Qj and then summing over all firms in industry s, using the notation that firm
revenue is Rj = PjQj and industry revenue is R =
∑Js
j=1Rj , and recalling that
equation (3) also defines industry quantity Q, we obtain Q = λR. Based on this
we can define the industry price index as P = 1/λ, plug this back into the first
order condition (A1) and raise that to the power −η to obtain the demand for
the product of firm j
(A2)
Qj
Q
= Vj
(
Pj
P
)−η
.
Multiplying by Pj and summing over j now gives the familiar expression P
1−η =∑
j VjP
1−η
j for the industry price index.
We then use (A2) to express firm revenue, deflated by the industry price index,
with firm and industry output as
(A3)
Rj
P
= Q1/ηV
1/η
j Q
(η−1)/η
j .
Production function. Given the Cobb-Douglas structure, total expenditure on
intermediatesM must equal their price index times their Cobb-Douglas aggregate:
(A4) Mj =
N∏
i=1
(γi/γ)
−γi/γ
N∏
i=1
P
γi/γ
ji
N∏
i=1
X
γi/γ
ji .
By (4) and (5), Pji = PiH exp(−a) for i ≤ nj and Pji = PiH otherwise. Denoting
the first term in (A4) by Γ, we have
Mj = Γ
N∏
i=1
P
γi/γ
iH
nj∏
i=1
exp(−aγi/γ)
N∏
i=1
X
γi/γ
ji .
It follows that
Mj = exp[−aG(nj)]Γ
N∏
i=1
P
γi/γ
iH
N∏
i=1
X
γi/γ
ji
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and
(A5)
N∏
i=1
Xγiji = M
γ
j exp[aγG(nj)]Γ
N∏
i=1
P−γiiH .
Define the industry input price index as
% = Γ
N∏
i=1
P
γi/γ
iH ,
the (share-weighted) geometric average of domestic input prices. We assume that
this is the input price index reported by the statistical office. The constant Γ
only pins down the level of prices, and hence does not affect the price index.
Taking logs in (A5), substituting in ρ = log(%) and combining the result with
(1) yields
qj = αkj + βlj + γ(mj − ρ) + aG(nj) + ωj
which is the quantity production function (9). Combining it with (A3) yields
rj − p = 1
η
q +
1
η
vj + α
∗kj + β∗lj + γ∗(mj − ρ) + γ∗aG(nj) + ω∗j
which is the revenue production function (10).
A2. Profits as a function of the number of imported inputs
We now compute operating profits as a function of the number of imported
inputs n, assuming that other freely adjustable inputs are chosen optimally.
Spending on intermediate inputs is chosen before εj is realized. Because of the
Cobb-Douglas structure, intermediate spending is a constant γ∗ share of expected
revenue Mj = γ
∗Eε(Rj), and expected operating profits are the remaining share
pij(n) = (1− γ∗)Eε(Rj). Because capital and labor had been chosen in advance,
their costs are sunk at this stage. Substituting in Mj = γ
∗Eε(Rj), the revenue
production function (10) implies that
(A6) Eε(Rj) = V
1/η
j PQ
1/ηE
(
eε
∗
j
)
Kα
∗
j L
β∗
j
(
γ∗EεRj
%
)γ∗
eγ
∗aG(nj)Ω∗j .
From this we can compute expected revenue for a firm that does not import by
setting nj = 0 and rearranging the equation to solve for Eε(Rj) which appears
on both sides. Since variable profits are a fraction 1− γ∗ of expected revenue we
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then obtain
pij(0) = (1− γ∗)
(
V
1/η
j PQ
1/ηE
(
eε
∗
j
)
Kα
∗
j L
β∗
j
(
γ∗
%
)γ∗
Ω∗j
)1/(1−γ∗)
.
Combining (A6) and pij(0) also gives expected operating profits from importing
n varieties
pij(n) = pij(0) exp
(
γ∗a
1− γ∗G(n)
)
.
Estimation
B1. Estimating the coefficients
First step of the Olley-Pakes procedure. We implement the estimation of (16)
by first regressing both sides on the flexible controls h˜(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt), then taking
the residuals, and then estimating the regression on the residuals using ordinary
least squares. We follow this approach because it is computationally easier, and
because the coefficients of the terms in h˜(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt) are not of direct interest
to us.
Second step of the Olley-Pakes procedure. Recall that we can write ωobsjt =
µ(s, c, o) + $jt where µ(s, c, o) = µ
1
s + µ
2
c + µo · o and $jt is a Markov process
satisfying $jt = f($j,t−1) + ejt where ejt are i.i.d. and independent of all other
shocks.
Building on Olley Pakes (1996) we regress exit in t on (i) a third-order poly-
nomial of Ij,t−1, kj,t−1 and lj,t−1 and the lagged variables oj,t−1, with coefficients
that are allowed to differ by year; plus (ii) a linear function of (lagged) industry
by year effects and county effects, and dj,t−1 and qst−1. We denote the predicted
exit probability by pˆexitjt . Then pˆ
exit
jt and $j,t−1 provide sufficient statistics about
the bias in $jt: denoting information available at t− 1 by Infot−1, we have
(B1) E($jt|exitjt = 0, Infot−1) = ψ(pˆexitjt , $j,t−1).
Because we do not observe $jt or $j,t−1, we express them using both the already
estimated and the as yet unknown production function coefficients. Denote by ζ
the vector of (unknown) coefficients α, β, η, µ1t , µ
2
c , µo. Then from (10) we get
$ˆjt(ζ) =
(
rjt − pst − γ∗(mjt − ρst )− δ∗G(njt)− ε∗jt
)
−
(
1
η
qst +
ψ0
η
+
ψ
η
djt + α
∗kjt + β∗ljt + µ1∗s + µ
2∗
c + µ
∗
o · o
)
where the unknowns in the first parenthesis were estimated in the first step—in
particular ε∗jt is the residual—and the coefficients in the second parenthesis form
the ζ vector which needs to be estimated. Note that ψ0/η cannot be separately
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identified from the fixed effects, so we ignore it.
We then estimate ζ from (B1) which, for firms that do not exit in year t, we
can write as
$jt(ζ) = ψ(pˆ
exit
jt , $j,t−1(ζ)) + e˜jt
where ψ is the conditional expectation and hence e˜jt is uncorrelated with past
productivity and exit. To estimate this equation we approximate ψ as a third-
order polynomial, and impose the moment condition that e˜jt is orthogonal to the
following set of instruments: pˆexitit , $ˆj,t−1(ζ), kjt, ljt, kj,t−1, lj,t−1, ojt, q
s
t , qs,t−1
and djt.
Implementing this estimation using GMM is computationally difficult because
the many fixed effects µs and µc substantially increase the dimensionality of the
maximization problem. We therefore use an approximation to infer these fixed
effects and estimate only the remaining components of ζ with GMM. Specifically,
we estimate µs and µc as the average of observed productivity ω
obs
jt across all firms
and years for the given industry and county. Because we only observe surviving
firms, this approach yields biased estimates of the unconditional means. However,
if the bias is the same across industries and counties, then it would be subsumed
in the regression constant. To check whether this is the case, we explore to what
extent exit rates vary between industries and counties. Industry and county fixed
effects explain only 0.6 percent of the variation in exit rates across firms. This
suggests that the heterogeneity in the bias which we ignore by using simple means
is likely to be small.
B2. Bootstrap
We obtain standard errors, confidence intervals and p-values from a bootstrap
with 500 draws. We sample firms with replacement, holding their entire time
path together to preserve the joint distribution of variables at different points in
time. This is akin to clustering standard errors by firm. We then estimate the
model for each of the 500 draws. Standard errors are obtained as the empirical
standard deviation of the 500 estimates. We define the 95 percent confidence
interval of a parameter (reported for example for the elasticity of substitution θ)
as the range between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the empirical distribution
of the estimates for that parameter.
We conduct the two-tailed test for the hypothesis that A = 1 as follows. If the
estimate Aˆ > 1, we count the number of realizations in the bootstrap for which
Aˆ(bs) ≤ 1 and we compute the p-value as 2/500 times this number. Similarly, if
Aˆ < 1, the p-value is based on the number of estimates for which Aˆ(bs) ≥ 1.
B3. Fixed costs
Estimating the parameters. Denoting the number of observations in industry s
and year t by Nst, we estimate the expected unobserved productivity shock as a
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weighted average across firms,
Eˆst
(
eε
∗)
=
∑Jst
j=1 Φjte
ε∗jt∑Jst
j=1 Φjt
where the right hand-side sums over all observations in industry s and year t.
The weight
Φjt = exp
[
1
η
qst +
1
η
ψ0 +
ψ
η
· djt + α∗kj + β∗lj + γ∗(mj − ρst ) + δ∗G(nj) + h(Ijt, kjt, ljt, zjt)
]
is chosen based on (15) to ensure that total actual industry revenue equals total
expected industry revenue in each s and t.
For firm j in year t, we denote by
∆pijt(n) = pijt(0)
[
e
γ∗a
1−γ∗G(n) − e γ
∗a
1−γ∗G(n−1)
]
the increase in variable profit from importing the nth product. We introduce the
notation
νn = ln
[
e
γ∗a
1−γ∗G(n) − e γ
∗a
1−γ∗G(n−1)
]
so that
∆pijt(n) = pijt(0)e
νn .
The firm chooses to import njt products if
f
(njt)
jt ≤ ∆pijt(njt), and f (njt+1)jt > ∆pijt(njt + 1).
Recall that we model the fixed cost schedule as f
(n)
jt = exp(κ
D
n 1
D
jt + κ
F
n 1
F
jt +
ϑjt). We estimate the fixed costs separately for firms that have or have not been
foreign owned. Consider firms that have been foreign owned (1Fjt = 1, 1
D
jt = 0).
Taking logs of the above inequalities, substituting in the fixed costs and νn, and
rearranging, we obtain the following optimality conditions
(B2) κFnjt − νnjt ≤ lnpijt(0)− ϑjt < κFnjt+1 − νnjt+1.
We use ordered probit to estimate the parameters of these inequalities. More
specifically, dividing by σFϑ yields
1
σFϑ
(κFnjt − νnjt) ≤
1
σFϑ
lnpijt(0)− 1
σFϑ
ϑjt <
1
σFϑ
(κFnjt+1 − νnjt+1).
This is exactly a set of ordered probit inequalities with 1
σFϑ
lnpijt(0)− 1σFϑ ϑjt as the
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latent variable and 1
σFϑ
(κFnjt−νnjt) as bounds. The coefficient of lnpijt(0) is 1/σFϑ ,
which gives us an estimate of σFϑ . Combining this parameter with the νn which
we can express as a function of our estimates of a, γ∗ and G(n), we can recover
the fixed cost function κn. A similar set of inequalities holds for firms that have
not been foreign owned, and we estimate the parameters of those analogously.
Estimating the fixed cost realization. The total importing cost paid by a firm
that has been foreign owned and imports njt products is
njt∑
i=1
f
(i)
jt = e
ϑjt
njt∑
i=1
eκ
F
i .
We do not know the realization of ϑjt, but we can put bounds on it based on the
profit maximization inequalities (B2):
lnpijt(0) + νnjt+1 − κFnjt+1 < ϑjt ≤ lnpijt(0) + νnjt − κFnjt .
Here we have estimates for both the upper and the lower bound. We can then
draw a simulated fixed cost by drawing an ϑjt from its estimated distribution
conditional on these bounds. The f¯jt constructed from that ϑjt is our estimate of
the firm’s fixed cost schedule. We use the same procedure to estimate the fixed
cost schedule of firms that have not been foreign owned.
Counterfactuals
We conduct counterfactual experiments with respect to (1) tariffs τ , (2) the
fixed costs of importing f , and (3) the share of foreign firms in the economy. We
now discuss how we measure the effect of these counterfactual changes on total
factor productivity and the demand for domestic inputs.
Tariffs affect relative prices in equation (4). We assume that both the domestic
and the pre-tax import prices are unaffected by the tariff change. Then, a tariff
rate of τ > 0 raises the relative price of imported goods by a factor 1 + τ . The
productivity gain from importing a particular product is now smaller,
(C1) a′ =
log
[
1 +
(
A
1+τ
)θ−1]
θ − 1 .
Given these counteractual parameters, we use equation (11) to solve for the new
optimal number of imported products n′. Because the per product import gain
is reduced, firms will typically enter fewer import markets. The overall (revenue)
productivity gains from importing are reduced to γ∗a′G(n′). We use these values
to compute both firm-level and aggregate productivity in the counterfactual.
As both the number of imported products and the amount imported from each
product fall, overall demand for imports also fall. There is a corresponding in-
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crease in the demand for domestic products. We use equation (8) and (14) to
express the domestic input demand of firm j as
MHj
′
= γ∗R′jS
′G(n′j),
and then add up across firms to get the total demand.
Varying the fixed cost schedule f¯ has no direct effect on a or S, but it does affect
the costs in the optimization problem (11) for the number of imported varieties.
We account for these costs and otherwise proceed as above in this counterfactual.
Changing the ownership status of the firm to foreign involves (i) changing the
per-product import gain from aD to aF ; (ii) changing the fixed cost schedule to
that estimated for foreign firms; and (iii) a direct change in mean productivity
by µFω . After implementing these changes we proceed as above in computing the
outcomes of interest.
